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RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW. Bruce A. Ackerman. Harvard Univ.
Press. 1984. Pp. 128. $16.00 (cloth).
Legal academics are by now well aware that a new mode of anal-
ysis has emerged in legal scholarship over the past twenty years or
so.1 Though its exemplars are a diverse group, this new form of
legal reasoning in general utilizes the analytical tools of
microeconomics, game theory, and related fields as the means to
develop policy recommendations for lawmakers. 2 In his new book,
Reconstructing American Law,3 Professor Bruce Ackerman synthesizes
the scattered work in this vein into a movement to which he gives
the name "Legal Constructivism." Noting that Constructivism is al-
ready upon us, 4 Ackerman's objectives are twofold: first, to explain
why the rest of the legal profession should cast off its old ways and
join the new movement, and, second, to explain why legal culture,
or at least part of it, has already turned to this new discourse. A
book with such broad ambitions requires far more detail and expli-
cation than this slim volume provides. So, if the success of a book is
* Professor of Law, Cornell University; B.A. 1970, University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign; J.D. 1973, Northwestern University. I am grateful to Dennis Hutchinson
for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
1 See, e.g., Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 387 (1981) (identifying this mode of analysis as "liberal law and economics").
2 Some of the early writings that were influential in establishing Constructivism
are the following: Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of
Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies, and income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971);
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1972); Markovits, The Distrib-
utive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical
Clarfications, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1976); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Com-
ments on the Ethical Foundations of '"ust Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
3 B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAw 3 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
ACKERMAN).
4 Ackerman previously identified the emergence of Legal Constructivism within
modem scholarship on the takings problem in his book, B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY AND THE CONsTrrurioN (1977). Reconstructing American Law, in a sense, merely elab-
orates on the basic vision underlying Private Property.
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measured, as one supposes it ordinarily is, by whether it makes good
on its promises, this book must be counted as a failure.
Despite the temptation to dismiss this book, however, it de-
serves to be read and discussed because it is a particularly clear ex-
ample of a growing concern in legal thought. In making the case for
Constructivism, Ackerman is really attacking irrationalism, which he
sees as our legacy from Legal Realism and which is resurgent in
some quarters, notably within the Critical Legal Studies movement. 5
Unlike these skeptics, Ackerman, to quote Anthony Kronman's re-
cent description of the rationalist, believes that lawyers should be
"confident in our power to discover the norms that ought to govern
us through an abstract philosophical reflection untainted by experi-
ence or historical fact, and equally confident in our ability to imple-
ment whatever norms we choose through the systematic and self-
conscious reconstruction of existing institutions from the bottom
up.6
Ackerman's defense of this rationalist dogma comes at a partic-
ularly appropriate time. A "rationality debate" has been the center
of attention in several other fields in recent years. In anthropology,7
philosophy,8 and literary theory,9 to name only three fields in which
the debate has been especially prominent, skepticism about the pos-
sibilities for discovering any "privileged vocabulary" has been met
by a counter-attack on such ideas as being "relativist" and "nihilist."
Until recently this debate has not been conspicuous in the legal
literature.10 That condition is rather clearly changing, however.
The irrationalist outlook-or at least the perception of it-in Criti-
cal Legal Studies has already provoked a Reason-in-Distress reac-
tion."1 With Reconstructing American Law we now have an explicit
prescription for purging legal thought of all vestiges of
irrationalism.
Ackerman's case for formal rationality, however, is ultimately
5 Examples of irrationalist thought within Critical Legal Studies are Singer, The
Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
6 Kronman, Alexander Bichel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE LJ. 1567, 1571 (1985).
7 The prominent figure here is Clifford Geertz. See, e.g., Geertz, Anti-Anti-Relativ-
ism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 263 (1984).
8 See, e.g., R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM passim (1982).
9 Irrationalist literary criticism, centered largely around the "Deconstructionist"
movement, has produced a massive corpus of writing. Perhaps the most prominent of
the Deconstructionists is Jacques Derrida. See, e.g., J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (G.
Spivak trans. 1976).
10 Joseph Singer's recent paper, supra note 5, should begin to connect the rational-
ity debate with current legal theory.
11 See Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984), and the corre-
spondence that Dean Carrington's paper provoked, published in 35J. LEGAL EDUC. 1-26
(1985).
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unconvincing. Rather than providing an affirmative argument ex-
plaining why the conceptual apparatus of Constructivism is desira-
ble (or indeed how formal rationality in legal analysis is even
possible), Ackerman writes at the level of intellectual history by giv-
ing an account of the rise of Constructivism as a reaction to the "in-
tuitionism"' 2 of Realist analysis. By explaining Constructivism in
these terms, however, Ackerman undermines his own deeper objec-
tive, to convince us that Constructivism is a strongly rational mode
of legal analysis. His own historicizing of Constructivism draws at-
tention to the very contingency of the new legal language that, as a
rationalist, Ackerman wants to deny. This essay focuses on this ten-
sion within Ackerman's book, not because it is intrinsically impor-
tant whether Ackerman is faithful to his historicist sources 13 but
because the book illustrates why the quest for legal rationality, in-
creasingly evident these days, is quixotic. Had Ackerman taken his
own historicism seriously, he would have written a very different
book, one that was far more skeptical about Constructivism and ra-
tionality in legal thought.
Ackerman argues that Legal Constructivism originated from
two twentieth-century "revolutions": the New Deal of the 1930s
and the Coasean revolution, 14 which began in the 1960s. Whereas
the New Deal represented a broad socio-political transformation in
thought and institutions, the Coasean revolution more narrowly has
affected legal methodology. Coase, argues Ackerman, jettisoned
the particularistic epistemology of Legal Realism, replacing it with a
systematic approach to legal facts. 15 Constructivism synthesizes the
political revolution of the activist state with the methodological
revolution of Coasean systematic inquiry to create a kind of new lib-
eral legal science.
For lawyers, Ackerman contends, the New Deal was significant
primarily because it changed the political premises of legal dis-
course. It radically transformed legal culture from "reactive lawyer-
ing" to "activist lawyering." Reactive lawyering, which Ackerman
associates with the legal culture of nineteenth-century formalism, 16
12 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 19, 38, 72-78, 108.
13 He explicitly relies on T.S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(2d ed. 1970). ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 60 n. 16. See infra text accompanying notes 33-
38.
14 By "Coasean revolution," Ackerman refers to the cost-benefit analysis of
problems involving the allocation of entitlements that scholars usually associate with the
famous paper by Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
15 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 46-71.
16 Id. at 17.
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accepted the legitimacy of social arrangements generated by unreg-
ulated markets. Activist lawyering rejects this laissez-faire tradition
and calls for state intervention to improve the social and economic
welfare. Ackerman emphasizes that the New Deal activism did not
unqualifiedly embrace intervention or usher in an era of collectiv-
ism. Insofar as it justifies state initiatives only when intervention en-
hances the reality of individual rights, activism is consistent with the
liberal ideal of limited government.
Other scholars have noted that Legal Realism was connected
with an activist political vision,' 7 but Ackerman adds a twist to this
view of Realism. He argues that Realism, which was well underway
by the mid-1930s, allowed the legal culture to accommodate the
new activist political premise-and the institutional change it
wrought-without concomitantly altering the familiar reactivist
mode of discourse. He rejects the view that Realism was an icono-
clastic movement bent upon a deconstruction of the Conceptualism
practiced by high formalists like Joseph Henry Beale.18 Instead,
Ackerman interprets Realism as a culturally conservative movement
because it salvaged most of the legal profession's familiar concep-
tual apparatus despite the great changes in the materials and institu-
tions with which lawyers dealt.' 9 Realism achieved this high degree
of continuity in legal discourse by introducing a sense of skepticism
that demoted traditional doctrines-freedom of contract, freedom
of disposition, private property, and fault-from cornerstones to
mere starting points. Thus, an adjudicator can supplement or aban-
don, ad hoc, as her "situation sense" 20 of justice requires.
Constructivism began to emerge when the Coasean revolution
prompted lawyers to reconsider how factually to frame legal dis-
putes. Ronald Coase's famous story of the farmers and the ranch-
ers2' has served as the model for changing the way lawyers construct
17 For example, my colleague Robert Summers has pointed out that Realism, which
he treats as part of a broader theory that he calls "pragmatic instrumentalism," can be
connected with the Progressive movement in the early twentieth century. R. SUMMERS,
INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 29, 49, 84, 201 (1982). Whatever con-
nection existed between Realism and the New Deal, for obvious chronological reasons,
one cannot maintain that the New Deal was the genesis for Realism.
18 See, e.g., E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURAL-
ISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973); M. WHrlE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE
REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (2d ed. 1957).
19 None of the familiar studies of Realism, such as W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968) and W. TWINING,
KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973), make the point that Realism's
skepticism and intuitionism facilitated continuity of discourse even though the political
underpinning of Classical discourse had been largely abandoned.
20 The term is Llewellyn's. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECID-
ING APPEALS 121 (1960).
21 Coase's story of farmers and ranchers illustrates his economic analysis of "those
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and, hence, resolve legal problems. By introducing the concept of
transaction costs into legal discourse, or more specifically, the hy-
pothesis of zero transaction costs, Coasean analysis altered the tem-
poral framework for analyzing even the simplest dispute. The
starting point for legally relevant facts receded from the moment of
initial conflict to the moment when the parties planned or might
have planned their activities to avoid the conflict. From this ex ante
perspective, facts traditionally ignored by legal storytellers became
analytically critical: the rancher's failure to hire an extra hand, the
farmer's failure to construct an effective fence, the polluting fac-
tory's failure to add available pollutant-reducing devices, and so on.
The assumption of zero transaction costs, by its very unreality, illu-
minated the need to identify and analyze the complex range of
transaction problems that prevent rational accommodation of con-
flicting interests through the market alone. This perspective has led
to the development of new concepts of central importance to Con-
structivist legal epistemology-"free riders," "holdouts," "strategic
behavior," and the like. 22
Thus far, Legal Constructivism simply incorporated the episte-
mology of welfare economics for the purpose of factual analysis.
But it is an activist and "progressive" political strategy that Acker-
man believes the New Deal revolution compels legal culture to pur-
sue. 23 Constructivism, unlike the Chicago approach to law-and-
economics, did not stop with the Coasean transformation of factual
inquiry. Animated by awareness that the New Deal had committed
the legal system to an activist liberal political premise, Construc-
tivists pushed ahead to develop a language of value inquiry as
well. 24
Ackerman is anxious to demonstrate that the center-left, Con-
structivist version of legal economics is not only subtler than the
Chicago version but that it was also necessitated by the New Deal.
Specifically, he argues, the Chicago school's fixation with allocative
efficiency presents a "distorted account of the fundamental values of
sections of business firms which have harmful effects on- others." Coase, supra note 14,
at 1.
22 For an introduction to this vocabulary, now widely used in the law-and-econom-
ics literature, see A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 18-20 (1983).
23 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 19-22.
24 Any doubt about Ackerman's commitment to positivism is dispelled by his adher-
ence to the distinction between learning facts and acquiring values. This Review leaves
to one side the objections that have been raised against this distinction in nonlegal liter-
ature. Three prominent critiques of the fact-value dichotomy underlying the whole pos-
itivist tradition are M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (I. Macquarrie & E. Robinson trans.
1962); H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975); andJ.P. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHING-
NESS (H. Barnes trans. 1956).
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the American legal tradition." 25 The overturning of the laissez-faire
state committed the legal system to a greater willingness to inter-
vene in the operation of the market in order to "improve upon the
invisible hand." 26 Constructivism emerged as an alternative to Re-
alism and, more recently, to Chicago law-and-economics because it
and it alone can "redeem the promise of the New Deal." 27
The pervasive problem of "market failure" justifies this willing-
ness to regulate. Unlike the Chicagoan, the Constructivist recog-
nizes that the complexity of modern society and economy generates
transactional problems that frustrate market solutions. To be sure,
the Chicagoan recognizes the occasional market failure justifying
second-best legal intervention. But, unlike the Chicagoan, the Con-
structivist takes market pathology seriously and regards transac-
tional defects in complex societies as pervasive. Consequently,
Constructivists consider legal interventionism, or "activism," an in-
escapable fact of life.28
Equally important, the Constructivist fully admits the relevance
of efficiency to interventionist decisionmaking but, unlike the Chi-
cagoan, seeks to enrich rather than eschew normative discourse as a
central element of legal analysis. Acting on an abiding faith in the
possibility of rational value discourse, the Constructivist explicitly
addresses fundamental questions about the right and the good
within the adjudicatory context. Such normative discourse cannot
be adequately addressed in efficiency terms alone. Ackerman as-
serts that the inadequacy of efficiency as a moral value was demon-
strated to American lawyers long ago. The fall of Lochner v. New
York, 29 for example, "teaches us the legal folly of equating market
efficiency with social justice. °30 Similarly, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion31 "forces lawyers to come to terms with an affirmative value
[equality] before they can claim an understanding of the deepest as-
pirations of our existing legal system." 32
II
Ackerman credits Thomas Kuhn's thesis concerning the re-
placement of dominant paradigms in scientific thought as his inspi-
ration for this account of the fall of Realism and the rise of
25 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 43 n.13.
26 Id. at 105.
27 Id. at 106.
28 Id. at 60-65.
29 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
30 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 91.
31 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 91.
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Constructivism.3 3 Although Ackerman's account is superficially
consistent with Kuhn, Reconstructing American Law repudiates the
deeper implications of Kuhnian historiography. Kuhn argued that
revolutions in scientific thought occur when an orthodox theory, or
"paradigm," can no longer explain perceived phenomena; in other
words, when it fails to fulfill its problem-solving responsibility. Simi-
larly, Ackerman argues that scientific Constructivism is replacing or-
dinary legal analysis because of the inadequacies of intuitionism.
According to Ackerman, the rise of the activist state was the particu-
lar event that rendered orthodox legal analysis inadequate. Con-
structivism, but not Realism, meets the needs of welfare-state
capitalism.
Ackerman's commitment to legal rationalism, however, means
that he must somehow avoid the deeper implications of historicizing
Constructivism. He does so by providing an argument that contra-
dicts historicism. He explains the shift to Constructivism in terms of
adaptive evolution. He argues that the formality of Constructivism
renders it better adapted to the needs of the activist welfare state
than the informality of Realism. Accepting a familiar instrumentalist
view, Ackerman emphasizes the greater need for formality in our
administrative state in order to minimize the potential for abuse of
individual rights posed by "administrative discretion."3 4
Indeed, Ackerman explains the emergence of Realism itself in
adaptive terms. He depicts Realism as a transitional stage through
which American legal thought had to pass on its way to a more ma-
ture version of formalism. Realism served to demonstrate the in-
compatibility of the ideology of Conceptualism with the New Deal.
"[T]he shock of the activist state," Ackerman argues, "forced a
change in discursive direction." 35 Prompted by this political
change, Realism demonstrated to lawyers that they could no longer
assume the formal determinacy and moral adequacy of Classical
concepts like fault and bargain. Realism made them aware that
problem resolution touched upon messy value issues. It, however,
remained an immature form of legal thought because it continued
to structure factual issues in the Classical, non-systematic fashion
and to resolve those value-laden issues intuitively. Its crude, intui-
tive fact-value analysis is now replaced by a mode of legal analysis
that will instrumentally meet the needs of the liberal activist state.
Ackerman's tactic of using an adaptive theory of change as a
defense of rationalism is, like all other instances of the same argu-
ment, vulnerable to the critique of historicism. That critique, com-
33 Id. at 60 n.16.
34 Id. at 75.
35 Id. at 12.
1985] 255
CORNELL LI W REVIEW
monly associated with Kuhn but certainly not confined to him,36
demonstrates how the basic ways in which individuals organize the
social world, their conceptual structures and languages, are cultur-
ally and historically contingent. Modes of discourse cannot be ob-
jectified by so-called external determinants. Kuhnian
historiography emphasizes the historicist nature of belief-structures
and denies the predominance of functional determinism. Acker-
man, by contrast, makes legal thought a variable factor, ultimately
grounded in external determinants. This view of the dependency of
ideas upon the existing mode of political organization more closely
resembles the functional determinism of scientific Marxism, 37 which
treats economic relations as the "base" and ideas as the "super-
structure," than it does Kuhnian historiography.38
This contrast between Ackerman and Kuhnian historiography
occurs not simply because Ackerman relies on the wrong sources,
but because it indicates the central weakness of Ackerman's case for
legal rationalism. Historicism, or what Richard Rorty calls "pragma-
tism," 3 9 temporalizes rationality by demonstrating that the vocabu-
laries of scientific knowledge are, after all, mortal. Recognizing that
nothing is immune from cultural development, the pragmatist gives
up the quest for an optimal set of conceptual tools. Yet Ackerman
rejects this consequence of the historicist perspective and, instead,
believes in the possibility of an objective, neutral, language that
would compel agreement.40 Because he objectifies conceptual
structures, that is, sees them as inherently connected with particular
modes of economic and political order, Ackerman is committed to
36 See sources cited supra notes 7-9.
37 The distinction between "scientific" and "critical" Marxism is discussed in A.
GOULDNER, THE Two MARxisMs: CONTRADICTIONS AND ANOMALIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THEORY (1981).
38 The resemblance to scientific Marxism is strengthened, and the similarity to
Kuhn is weakened, by Ackerman's apparent belief that the history of American legal
consciousness has direction. Like Marx, Ackerman not only sees history as divided into
identifiable stages, but also regards the transitions from one stage to another as progres-
sive, toward some ultimate, rational point, although Ackerman and Marx would not
agree on the identity of that telos.
Looking for theoretical constructs from other disciplines that might serve more ap-
propriately than Kuhn as analogues for Ackerman's progressive account, one might turn
to evolutionary theories of individual moral consciousness. Just as theorists like
Kohlberg posit an optimal end-point of moral development, see L. KOHLBERG, THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OFJJUSTICE (1981), so
Ackerman regards the stages of collective legal consciousness as evolving toward greater
rationality, with Constructivism its ultimate stage. Extending this analogy, Realism, with
its intuitionist approach to value questions, becomes something like adolescence, that
penultimate period in the individual's struggle to abandon those naive notions that sim-
plify his world. With Constructivism, legal culture finally attains adulthood, prepared to
order the complexities of the welfare state with its new, sophisticated language.
39 R. RORTY, supra note 8.
40 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 99-101.
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the view that every given form of economic organization has an opti-
mal vocabulary.4' Consequently, he denies that the same economic
and political ends could be achieved through any of several alterna-
tive vocabularies. Stated affirmatively, the claim is truly heroic: once
lawyers find the correct vocabulary, they can eliminate all of the in-
adequacies of the present legal order.
Understood in these terms, Constructivism fits Ackerman's own
characterization of Realism-a "culturally conservative move-
ment."42 Realism was culturally conservative because it allowed
lawyers to preserve much of the discourse of the Classical era. Con-
structivism changes this discourse, but its very pretensions to scien-
tism blind it to its own contingency. Constructivism evades on-
going questioning of the sufficiency of its analytical assumptions and
the legitimacy of the legal order it creates. Because it claims to pro-
vide a privileged vocabulary, Constructivism, in a manner reminis-
cent of Classicism, is a wholesale constraint on inquiry into other
possible languages and, ultimately, other possible legal and social
orders.
Constructivism, then, makes the same pretense to validity for
which Classical legal thought was so notorious. But Realism showed
that the project of objectivity is misguided. The quest to ground
legal analysis is pointless, Realists said, for it is a matter of convic-
tion, not knowledge, convention, not reason. Realism grew not out
of a preference but out of a realization that once the limits to legal
science are identified, intuitionism, bracketed by conformity to con-
ventions around us, is all we have.
Similar to other recent defenses of rationalism, Ackerman's re-
treat from the implications of historicizing all legal languages is
based on fear. The Constructivist fears that if we rely on irrational-
ist intuitionism in the welfare state, discretion in the hands of bu-
reaucrats inevitably will degenerate into the arbitrary and
dehumanizing exercise of power. Constructivism self-consciously
formalizes legal analysis on the basis of the traditional rationalist
belief that without rules we lack the "cognitive control" essential to
prevent oppression and social injustice. Ackerman's call to make
legal analysis more formal, rigorous, and professional grows out of
the belief, or hope, that the right conceptions of reason and justice
in law, systematically determined as some mixture of efficiency and
fairness, will shield us against "tyranny." 43
The intuitionist's only possible response to Ackerman is confes-
sion and avoidance. Intuitionism has no guarantees, but how can its
41 Id. at 45.
42 Id. at 13.
43 Id. at 98-100.
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existence be denied? Rather than trying to cast out the demon, in-
tuition, we would better spend our time exorcising the real evil, the
undifferentiated fear of intuitionism. Intuitionism itself is merely
there. To use Ackerman's own preferred vocabulary, rationality is
"bounded. '44 Given the inherent limits on the human capacity to
see and to predict, the formalist, whether Classicist or Constructiv-
ist, cannot hope to eliminate discretion and intuition from legal
analysis. Non-formalists believe that greater hope exists for
preventing abuse if they openly acknowledge the inevitable role of
intuition rather than deny it. This move beyond formalism, indeed
beyond method, gives the legal culture an opportunity really to ma-
ture by supposing that the ways in which we think and talk, the con-
ceptual tools we develop, are beyond our control because they are
necessitated by some external factor.
Living with intuition does not mean that we reject Ackerman's
faith that the legal culture can "improve upon the invisible hand." 45
Far from it. Realism developed on the basis of just that faith. Ac-
ceptance of intuitionism merely requires that we recognize as a false
hope the promise that a new vocabulary can guarantee this improve-
ment. No vocabulary is so privileged.
At the same time, the intuitionist need not fastidiously refuse all
of Constructivism's new vocabulary to avoid becoming a Construc-
tivist. In the deconstructed legal culture lawyers must be intellec-
tual scavengers, raiding other disciplines for helpful vocabularies,
using as much of the discourse as seems helpful, and discarding the
rest. For example, the deconstructive lawyer can happily agree with
Ackerman that the language of "unequal bargaining power" is un-
helpful,46 and that such talk obscures the real problem, which is the
ubiquity of "market failures" generated by "bounded rationality."
But, unlike Ackerman, the deconstructivist concludes that we should
talk explicitly about paternalism. The dread of intuitionism and pa-
ternalism is warranted only if we maintain social arrangements that
frustrate our capacity to gain understanding of each other. Intui-
tionism requires knowledge of others that can only be obtained
through empathy and intimate association. The prospects for such
knowledge may seem bleak because distorted communication ac-
companies our society's diversity.47 But denying any role for intui-
44 Id. at 56, 58.
45 AcKEiN, supra note 3, at 105. Ackerman, of course, believes that understand-
ing "social reality" is the key to improvement. Id.
46 See Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special
References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1982).
47 The attempt to resuscitate rationality within the context of the social theory of
communication and the possibility of undistorted communication in the "life world" are,
of course, themes Juergen Habermas developed. Like Ackerman, Habermas wants to
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tion, refusing even to make the attempt to dissolve the impediments
to empathy with others, only ensures that these barriers will domi-
nate social life. Constructivism's systematic focus on "complex mar-
ket processes"' 48 excludes ad hoc attempts to understand the
individuals involved and intuitionally "get it right." Far from
"civiliz[ing] the powers of technocracy, ' 49 Constructivism exacer-
bates the dehumanizing effects of technocracy. Legal culture cannot
hope to improve upon the invisible hand without a commitment to
empathy. Ackerman concludes Reconstructing American Law with this
observation: "political commitment is no substitute for legal delib-
eration."50 He may be right, but, to borrow his own words, "the
reverse is also true": 51 legalistic deliberation is no substitute for
human commitment.
Ackerman invites the entire legal profession to become born-
again formal rationalists. For those who have not immersed them-
selves in the waters of Constructivism, even a slight recollection of
the Realist critique of formalism should provide adequate grounds
for being skeptical about this book's claims for illuminating the path
to salvation.
establish social consensus in order to avoid coercion, but the two pursue consensual
coordination from very different perspectives. Ackerman's constructive legal culture,
viewed in Habermas's terms, merely exacerbates the problem of institutional control of
the life world by pushing communicatively-structured social interaction more and more
to the margins and subordinating the life world to systematic imperatives. See J.
HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (trans. J. Shapiro 1971); J. HABERMAS,
COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY (trans. T. McCarthy 1979).
48 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 72.
49 Id. at 109.
50 Id. at 110.
51 Id.
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